Specifications TableSubjectFinanceSpecific subject areaEmpirical Banking in RussiaType of dataTable (Excel Format)How data were acquiredHand collected from public online sourcesData formatRawParameters for data collectionClosure reasons of Russian banksDescription of data collectionHand collected from public online sourcesData source locationRussiaData accessibilityRepository name: Mendeley Data\
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17632/g7msxkcg55.2>\
URL: <https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/g7msxkcg55/2>**Value of the Data**•These data report closure reasons of Russian banks.•The data benefits researchers who study Russian banks or compare banking systems across countries.•The data can be used to empirically develop failure prediction models that take into account the after-the-fact revealed reasons of bank closure.•The data can be used to study financial misreporting and money laundering by Russian banks.

1. Data {#sec1}
=======

The dataset \[[@bib1]\] represents a table in Excel. Variables are in columns; variable names are in the first row. Rows correspond to different observational units, that is, different Russian credit institutions. Each institution is identified by its unique official registration number reported in the first column. This registration number should be used as key when merging the dataset with other data on Russian banks \[[@bib2]\]. The list of institutions is limited to those that have (been) closed down. The closure date is reported in the second column. In what follows I use the words 'bank' and 'credit institution' interchangeably.

For each bank the third column reports a list of 5-character tags separated by spaces. Each tag corresponds to a specific reason of bank closure. Missing values represent banks for which closure reasons are not available. The next section provides further details.

2. Experimental design, materials, and methods {#sec2}
==============================================

When a bank closes down the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) issues an official communication in which it explains the reasons of closure. Excerpts from these official communications are reported on a number of online portals. In what follows, I draw on the 2700+ excerpts reported in the Memory Book of Banki.ru \[[@bib3]\].

I read the excerpts. As I read, I encounter reasons of bank closure. For each newly encountered reason I generate a tag, which I then place next to every bank whose excerpt contains that reason. For example, a tag *S1mac* is placed next to every bank that closed down because of a merger or acquisition. Banks with multiple reasons get multiple tags.

The correspondence between tags and closure reasons is summarized in [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}. The first column reports the tags. The second column reports the reasons of closure. The third column reports the most common phrases the Central bank uses in its official communications that correspond to those reasons. All tags are divided into 8 categories. I discuss these categories below.Table 1Tag description.Table 1TagReasonCentral Bank mentionsA1llrinsufficient provisions for lossesunderestimates risk; overestimates asset quality; creates insufficient loss reservesA2rsktoo much riskrisky credit policy; excessive risk; low asset qualityC1finpoor financial conditionunsatisfactory financial condition; hides real financial condition; unsuccessful attempts to improve the situation; large asset loss, etc.C2solsolvency riskbankrupt; need for measures to avoid bankruptcy; complete loss of capital; insolventC3c2pinsufficient capital adequacycapital adequacy critically low/below two percentC4lowinsufficient capitalcapital lower than requiredE1negloss-makingsuffers losses; negative net incomeL1debdebit balancedebit balance on correspondent account with the CBRL2lbldefault on obligationsunable to/does not honor its obligations (in time)M1capcaptivecaptive bank; serving business interests of owners/managersM2shddubious activitiesdubious, shadow, doubtful, fictitious, transit operations/activitiesM3tunasset tunnelingasset tunneling; replaces liquid assets with illiquidM4frdfraudfraud; financial pyramid; fakeM5terviolates anti-money laundering lawviolations of the federal law "On Counteracting the Legalization of criminal proceeds and the Financing of Terrorism" or related regulationsR1fedviolates lawsviolates federal banking lawsR2cbrviolates CBR regulationsviolates CBR regulationsR3nrmviolates prudential standardsviolates prudential standards for statutory ratios (norms)R4reqviolates rules on reserve requirementsviolates rules on reserve requirementsR5actno activityno activity/transactions; delay in starting operationsR6liclack of appropriate licenseexecuting transactions without appropriate licenseR7stcviolates statutory capital formation rulesviolates rules for statutory capital formationS1macMAmerger; acquisition; transformation into a subsidiaryS2liqvoluntary liquidationvoluntary liquidationT1misfinancial statements unreliableunreliable financial statements; violates principles of accounting; misreporting; factual absence of assets; etc.T2nonfinancial statements lackingdid not submit financial statementsT3audno auditno auditT4ddlfinancial statements submitted latemisses deadlines for submitting financial statements; delayed submissions

A-tags concern asset risk. *A1llr* tags banks that create insufficient provisions for possible losses. The CBR reports these banks to underestimate risk, overestimate asset quality, and create insufficient loss reserves. *A2rsk* tags banks that take too much risk. Their excerpts mention high risk credit policy, excessive risk taking, low asset quality, large amount of distressed assets, and similar. The two A-tags often co-occur, that is, banks that take excessive risk tend to underprovision for it.

C-tags concern capitalization and solvency. *C1fin* tags banks whose financial health the CBR considers generally unsatisfactory. This dissatisfaction is revealed in statements like 'unsatisfactory financial condition', 'hides real financial condition', 'fails to improve the situation', 'experiences problems', and other pejorative statements. The reasons for CBR\'s dissatisfaction are often unspecified. *C2sol* tags banks that are (on the verge of being) insolvent. The CBR reports these banks to be insolvent, bankrupt, in need of measures to avoid bankruptcy, or having lost all of their capital. *C3c2p* tags banks with too low capital adequacy. Their excerpts mention capital adequacy being critically low or below two percent. *C4low* tags banks whose capital falls short of established requirements, most frequently, short of established minimum value of statutory capital. The CBR often identifies these banks as failing to bring capital in line with requirements.

*E1neg* tags loss-making banks, that is, banks with negative net income.

L-tags concern liquidity. *L1deb* tags banks whose excerpts mention 'debit balance on correspondent account (with the CBR)'. This 'debit balance' represents a form of borrowing from the Central bank. It was prohibited in 1995. *L2lbl* tags banks that have (partly) defaulted on their obligations. The CBR identifies these banks as being unable to honor, or effectively not honoring, (some of) their obligations.

M-tags concern specific aspects of the bank\'s business model. *M1cap* tags captive banks. The CBR reports these banks to primarily serve the business interests of (i.e. lend to) a narrow group of customers connected to the bank\'s owners (or managers). *M2shd* tags banks engaged in dubious activities. Their excerpts mention dubious, shadow, doubtful, fictitious, transit (and other synonyms of shady) operations/activities or examples thereof. *M3tun* tags banks whose excerpts mention asset tunneling, for example, in the form of replacing liquid assets with illiquid. *M4frd* tags banks whose closure relates to some sort of fraud. Their excerpts mention 'fraud', 'financial pyramid', and 'fake'. *M5ter* tags banks whose excerpts mention violations of the anti-money laundering law (i.e. the federal law "On Counteracting the Legalization of criminal proceeds and the Financing of Terrorism") or related regulations.

R-tags concern violations of rules and regulations (with the exception of anti-money laundering law violations). *R1fed* tags banks that violate federal banking laws. *R2cbr* tags banks that violate CBR regulations. *R3nrm* tags banks that violate prudential standards for statutory ratios (norms). *R4req* tags banks that violate rules on reserve requirements. *R5act* tags banks that got a license but did not start operations. Their excerpts mention 'no activity', 'no transactions', and 'delay in starting operations'. *R6lic* tags banks that engaged in certain activities without having the appropriate license. *R7stc* tags banks that did not follow the right procedure when paying their initial capital. The CBR reports these banks to have violated rules for statutory capital formation.

T-tags concern transparency. *T1mis* tags banks engaged in financial misreporting. The CBR reports these banks to submit unreliable financial statements, to violate principles of accounting, to misreport specific balance sheet items, and similar. Note that insufficient provisions for possible losses are also a form of misreporting. For that reason, all banks tagged with *A1llr* should be considered as also tagged with *T1mis*. *T2non* tags banks that did not submit their financial statements to the CBR. *T3aud* tags banks that did not undergo a yearly audit. *T4ddl* tags banks that did not submit their financial statements on time.

*S1mac* tags banks that discontinue operations because of a merger, acquisition or transformation into a subsidiary. These banks come in two varieties. Some remain healthy until merger or acquisition. Others experience problems and are subject to Central Bank intervention. For these latter banks their acquisition is often facilitated by the Central Bank. Unfortunately, my data do not allow to distinguish these two varieties. Finally, *S2liq* tags banks that discontinue operations because of a voluntary liquidation.
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